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Abstract: Relations between Switzerland and the European Union might be perceived as interesting,
and at the same time an unprecedented example of the new, flexible integration. Despite more than a de-
cade of fruitful cooperation, many of its aspects remains controversial. The problem of autonomous ad-
aptation, lack of ability to influence decision-making processes within the Community, the opening of
the labor market for new EU member states or other institutional aspects of the implementation of the
agreements. These are just a part of the problems, which could be mentioned here. So the basic question
remains – what will happen next? Has this an unprecedented example of a new form of integration
reached its limits? What could be the prospects for the future cooperation? This article attempts to find
answers to these questions. Several scenarios are taking under consideration, based on an analysis of
current conditions and experiences, as well as on evaluation of the current political strategy of the gov-
ernment. That is: continuation of the bilateral relations, the accession to the European Union or the con-
clusion of a framework or association agreement. Those scenarios are being analysed in order to find the
most probably solution for the future relations between European Union and Switzerland.
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Introduction
S
witzerland is involved in the process of European integration in various di-
mensions, starting from the 1960s. It was a founding member of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), and in 1972, it signed the first agreement on free
trade with the EEC. From that point until the early nineties, we could observe
a certain stagnation in relations with the Community, which was primarily dic-
tated by political and economic factors, such as the satisfactory level of economic
relations and Switzerland’s neutrality, which constitutes an obvious barrier to fur-
ther integration. It should be added that the fairly conservative attitude of most
Swiss, who value independence and even a kind of isolationism of their own
country is also a barrier.
The situation changed dramatically after the collapse of the bipolar system and the re-
lated need to adapt to ongoing changes in international politics. The government in Bern
was forced to review its current political strategy as it was unsuitable for the new
geopolitical order, ongoing European integration and the emergence of different sources
of risks to the safety of Switzerland. The first, albeit unsuccessful, step in the establish-
ment of a new dimension of policy was the attempt at including Switzerland in the Euro-
pean Economic Area. The negative outcome of the referendum, despite promising
evidence in the form of the preceding, successful, votes on the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, foiled the ambitious plans of the government. The Swiss gov-
ernment had to quickly revise its own strategy, which resulted in the launch of bilateral
cooperation. This choice proved to be most appropriate. Public support for such forms of
cooperation grew, and in the late nineties the first set of agreements was signed, the so
called Bilaterale I. They covered seven thematic areas of an economic nature, including
the most controversial one, on the free movement of persons. The positive effects of the
first contracts encouraged the Swiss government to continue the path. Already in 2004,
another package of agreements – Bilaterale II was signed. They regulate cooperation in
the areas of, among others, harmonization of law, the struggle against tax evasion, fiscal
policy and participation in international research projects.
Scenarios for the future
After nearly a decade of policy towards the European Union, a general consensus
about the correctness of the chosen path, based on bilateral agreements, does not encour-
age change but rather a cementing of relationships for as long as possible into the future.
Public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of government policy and sees no need for
deeper integration. Also, the political elites and opinion leaders consider bilateralism the
best option. In their opinion, any radical change, in the short term, simply would not make
sense. It should be noted, however, that some aspects of this cooperation are causing a lot
of controversy, especially in relation to the asymmetry in relations between the EU and
Switzerland. Policy towards the European Union is therefore pragmatic and only to a mi-
nor extent dictated by ideological considerations such as the desire for integration or cre-
ation of a common Europe. If the strategy guarantees economic growth, and at the same
time does not impose a number of commitments that are difficult to accept, it is regarded
as appropriate.
In an interview with „Neue Zürcher Zeitung” in January 2008, Micheline Calmy-Rey,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed the desire to expand existing cooperation into fur-
ther contentious areas. It turns out, however, that the continuation of this path might not
be so simple. There are, in fact, more and more problems, confusion and mutual griev-
ances. Several questions can be mentioned here, such as the specificity of the Swiss polit-
ical system, institutional reform in the European Union, or the economic crises. Both
parties want to cooperate, but on their own terms. The general approach seems to be more
and more demanding, and not as enthusiastic and optimistic as in the early 1990s. Both
parties are trying to conduct discussions on the establishment of new regulatory bodies,
whose task would be to improve cooperation, but also to ensure greater respect for the
sovereignty of Switzerland. It is equally important to create a more transparent system of
mixed committee work and a better coordination of activities. It is postulated here to cre-
ate an additional body at ministerial level.
We can therefore create several scenarios for the further development of Swiss policy
towards the EU. Based on an analysis of current conditions and experiences, as well as on
an evaluation of the current political strategy of the government, we can identify three
possible options: continuation of bilateral relations, accession to the European Union, or
the conclusion of a framework or association agreement. Least likely is the suspension of
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cooperation and a return to isolationism, or inclusion in the European Economic Area, but
without joining the EU.1
Continuation of bilateral relations
As mentioned before, the Swiss government is conducting talks with the EU in new
areas. In September 2010, the Federal Council adopted a new report on European policy
which considers bilateralism as the optimal instrument to protect the interests of Switzer-
land (Bericht des Bundesrates über die Evaluation...). The government also recognizes
that bilateral cooperation is now much more difficult. Negotiations do not aim, however,
to conclude a package of Bilaterale III (although there are also followers of such a solu-
tion). Both parties believe that this form of negotiation significantly prolongs the process
and makes it more difficult to reach a compromise.
In November 2008, negotiations were started in the fields of agriculture, food and
health. Their goal is to open the market for the entire agri-food chain, as well as to
strengthen cooperation in the field of food safety and food products. Negotiations on this
matter are probably among the most difficult, mainly due to the nature of the agricultural
sector in Switzerland. Opening the market for agri-food products from the EU, usually
much cheaper, could have a significant adverse impact on the condition of Swiss produc-
ers. The liberalization of the agricultural market is also a consequence of the provisions of
the Doha Round in the World Trade Organization. The Government also considers this
agreement as part of reforms implemented consistently in this sector. In order to reduce
the negative effects of market opening, a special working group was set up, designed to
determine the instruments that would strengthen the competitiveness of Swiss products
on foreign markets (Freihandel mit der EU im Agrar- und Lebensmittelbereich…). There
are plans to create a system of support for local producers, which will enable the develop-
ment of the sector, making it more efficient and building a strong position against foreign
competition. The results of this group were presented in July 2009.
The Swiss government also aims to regulate the cooperation in the field of health care,
which currently operates in a very limited way. First of all, the national authorities have to
cooperate with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), head-
quartered in Stockholm. Switzerland also intends to take part in a Community action pro-
gram for the protection of health, which so far covers the period 2008–2013, but is likely
to be extended for a further period. Its aim is to support preventative medicine (Decision
No 1350/2007/EC of the European Parliament…).
Since November 2007, both parties have also held negotiations on the energy sector
(Verhandlungen Schweiz-EU im Strombereich…). The EU came forward with a proposal
of agreement. Its main objective is to secure the supply of electricity through the creation
of a single European market.2 This shall be possible due to the harmonization of safety
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1 For more see:Verhandlungen über Landwirtschaft, Lebensmittelsicherheit, Produktsicherheit und
öffentliche Gesundheit, Integrationsbüro EDA/EVD, Oktober 2009.
2 The creation of a single energy market will help to avoid the so-called blackouts (power outages)
caused by power failure or network congestion.
standards and the elimination of barriers to cross-border trade. One element of this pro-
cess is the separation of production from distribution services, which, in accordance with
new EU regulations, will not be able to be provided by a single company. This will create
an independent regulatory body to replace its counterparts at national levels. The main
aim is to establish free energy trade between the European Union and Switzerland. The
agreement also regulates the issue of the green energy market. Switzerland already earns
about one billion francs annually on trade in this sector (mainly from trade with Italy and
France) (Strom, 2010, p. 3). Agreement with the EU will facilitate access to EU markets
and further strengthen the position of Switzerland in the future.
As a complement to cooperation in the energy sector, there is also an agreement on
emissions trading. The domestic market is still small, which significantly increases the
cost of certificates and thus hampers the implementation of emission commitments. Ac-
cess to the EU market opens up new prospects for Swiss companies.
In September 2010, negotiations were launched on the participation of Switzerland in
the construction of the Galileo satellite navigation system.3 The government’s objective
is to ensure the participation of Switzerland in the construction of the system on an equal
basis, i.e. the right of co-decision and free access to know-how. The Galileo system can
provide an excellent basis for the development of the Swiss aviation industry and the ser-
vice sector.4
Two other areas are so far the subject of preliminary discussions. The first one con-
cerns cooperation in the within the European Defence Agency. Its activities include the
promotion of research and development and the promotion of international armaments
cooperation in Europe. The agency aims to harmonize the rules and regulations concern-
ing the manufacture and sale of arms and military equipment.
The second area is related to the Regulation of the European Parliament and European
Council, concerning the safe use of chemicals. The regulation aims to facilitate trade and
to ensure the safety of transport and storage. New EU rules make it difficult, as they are
not compatible with the existing regulations in Switzerland.
The main problem in bilateral cooperation is, however, fiscal policy and the harmoni-
zation of the market. Reaching a compromise in these two areas is extremely difficult. In
the case of liberalization of services, Switzerland is of the opinion that only certain sec-
tors should be covered by the agreement. The Swiss government believes that the aboli-
tion of all restrictions could adversely affect the labor market. The European Commission
insists, however, on not limiting the scope of the agreement, because it treats it as part of
the EU single market strategy, which involves both the free movement of capital, goods
and services and people. The discrepancies were too large, so the negotiations were sus-
pended. Both parties have promised to return to the subject in the near future.
A similar impasse can be observed in a dispute concerning the fiscal policy of individ-
ual cantons. Working meetings, periodically organized between representatives of both
parties have not yet brought any particular results, but have mainly involved presenting
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3 Galileo is the answer to the American GPS system, but unlike the latter, control of the European
system will be performed by civilian authorities, not the military.
4 See more Satellitennavigation (Galileo und EGNOS), Integrationsbüro EDA/EVD, September
2010.
positions and exchange of views (Dialog Steuerkontroverse…). The dispute is focused
around different interpretations of the Free Trade Agreement of 1972.
It should be noted that the issue of fiscal autonomy of cantons also has, besides the
economic aspects, political significance. The allegations made by the European Commis-
sion are, in fact, contrary to the elementary principles of the Swiss political system, in
which the individual components of the federation have considerable autonomy, includ-
ing over fiscal policy.5 It is difficult for federal authorities to influence the behavior of the
cantons in these areas which are still in their exclusive competence. Especially as this ini-
tiative would not have been the result of internal discussion or a part of wider reforms of
fiscal policy in Switzerland, but a postulate inspired by other EU countries.
Recent government announcements reinforce the belief that a compromise will be dif-
ficult to achieve. On June 15, 2012, the Federal Council adopted rules that will be the ba-
sis for further negotiations with the EU’s institutional areas:6
— consistent interpretation of the legal provisions in the agreements;
— adoption of the law must be dynamic, but not automatic. It must take into account the
Swiss constitution, including the need to conduct a referendum;
— Switzerland should be guaranteed the right of co-decision (so called Mitsprache-
rechts – decision shaping) in the establishment of a new law in the areas of bilateral
agreements;
— Switzerland should be entitled to establish an independent body that will oversee the
implementation of bilateral agreements;
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Table 1
Freedom of movement of persons according to bilateral agreement between EU
and Switzerland
Source: Integrationsbüro EDA/EVD.
5 For more see:Warum die materielle Steuerharmonisierung kein Rezept für die Schweiz ist, Referat
Bundesrat Hans-Rudolf Merz an der Bundessteuerkonferenz, Bern, 11.05.2006.
6 Bundesrat verabschiedet zuhanden der EU Grundsätze für institutionelle Lösungen, Medienmit-
teilung EDA/EVD, 15.06.2012.
— in case of violations of the agreement it is necessary to establish institutionalized
dialogue between the highest courts of Switzerland and the EU in order to ensure
uniformity of jurisprudence.
It is also worth mentioning that in the case of further enlargement of the EU, the Swiss
will probably again have to make a decision on opening their labor market for the new
members of the EU in a referendum. Public opinion is not so enthusiastic in that matter,
especially in view of the deepening of the European crisis. Economic migration to Swit-
zerland in April 2012 reached a level justifying the re-introduction by the government of
quota restrictions to new EU member states (in accordance with the provisions of the bi-
lateral agreements from 1999). Since May 2012, the government has reduced the number
of work permits issued (for more than one year) in Switzerland. This decision triggered
a wave of criticism from EU member states.
Joining the European Union
Government official announcements regarding European policies and the statements
by the foreign ministers of Switzerland suggest that accession to the European Union is
definitely the less likely option than the continuation of cooperation at the bilateral level.
Perhaps the pressure of the Community will be so large that membership will be inevita-
ble for Switzerland in the long term.
Political dimension
Considering the political aspects, we can talk about the positive implications for Swit-
zerland, in the form of the even stronger impact on the decision-making process within
the Community. The size of Switzerland does not guarantee a significant position among
the other members of the community. Especially in the context of the new method of vot-
ing in the EU Council adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon, which is not conducive to small
states.7 However, with appropriate and beneficial alliances, interaction could be signifi-
cant. Switzerland will be able to appoint a representative in the European Commission
(admittedly on a rotary basis) and in the General Secretariat of the Council. In addition,
membership provides the opportunity to occupy positions in the EU diplomatic service. It
is also worth mentioning that, since accession to the EU, one of the judges of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice could be Swiss.
On the other hand, we are dealing with a huge problem of a legislative nature, regard-
ing the necessity for the adoption of the acquis. Of course, Swiss legislation is, in the vast
majority, compliant with European law. This does not change the fact that, by the applica-
ble decision-making process and the division of responsibilities in the Swiss federation,
the issue of implementing a dynamically developing EU law results in a lot of complica-
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7 Switzerland will have 10 votes in the Council. The European Parliament will have a maximum of
20 members from Switzerland.
tions. Certain acts, such as the regulations, are directly applicable, which eliminates the
influence of the citizens on creating laws. This is similar in the case of basic civil rights,
such as a referendum or initiative. There is no doubt that the proposals in the referendum
will be able to relate, if at all, only to national implementation of rules. In case of failure to
implement EU directives on time, Switzerland will answer before the European Court of
Justice.
In those circumstances, it is particularly important to carry out the demands of deep
institutional reforms, addressing the division of competences between the government
and the cantons, as well as the functioning of direct democracy.
Adoption of EU policy will entail the necessity to transfer powers to a transnational
authority. Thus, the sovereignty of the state will be reduced in some areas. This applies in
particular to monetary policy and monetary union, unless of course Switzerland agreed to
replace the Swiss franc with the euro.
Currently, the problem of permanent neutrality, which makes it impossible to join the
transnational organization of a political nature, like the European Union, is raised more
rarely. A report of 1993 changed the meaning of neutrality in Switzerland’s foreign pol-
icy, but it is currently difficult to determine precisely whether it is a barrier to full integra-
tion or not.
Economic dimension
Taking into account the current level of integration and the areas that are already, or in
the near future will be regulated by bilateral agreements, it appears that economic argu-
ments will be against accession to the EU. What is more, membership of the EU will not
be a guarantee of Switzerland’s economic development.
According to a study conducted by UBS in 2000, during the first three years after ac-
cession to the EU, a mild economic slowdown is expected (Alleingang – Bilaterale
Verträge…, p. 8). However, in the long term, the economy is foreseen to grow much
faster than at the bilateral level, mainly due to the deregulation of markets.
By far the biggest loser will be the agri-food industry, which will most painfully feel
the abolition of export subsidies and import tariffs. The group that would benefit from the
changes includes the machinery and automotive industry, textile manufacturers and
watchmakers (Alleingang – Bilaterale Verträge…, p. 17). The banking sector will benefit
from integration of markets, although the issue of banking secrecy may cause many prob-
lems.8 Integration would not be relevant for businesses that have been present for a long
time in foreign markets and cope well with existing barriers.
It is worth mentioning the direct implications for the state budget. After accession to
the EU, Switzerland will become a net contributor. Each year, it will be forced to pay into
the EU budget about 3.5 billion francs. The total cost of membership, taking into account
expenses related to the implementation of EU legislation, the abolition of customs duties,
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8 The UBS report’s authors suggest that a similar system of banking secrecy operates in Austria and
Luxembourg. It is therefore suggested that the current pressure on Switzerland by the European Com-
mission is a kind of demagogy.
the implementation of programs and policies, and other administrative expenses, may
come to slightly over 5 billion francs. Part of this amount will be compensated in the form
of additional government revenues, due to a higher VAT rate. It will be increased from
the current rate of 7.5% to 15%. At present, it is difficult to predict the final balance of
gains and losses related to changes in tax rates.
Alternative forms of integration
In the discussions on the future development of relations with the EU proposals for
a framework or association agreement sometimes occur (Europabericht 2006 vom
28. Juni 2006…). Many times this has been subject of debate during sessions in the Swiss
parliament (Bericht der APK des Ständerates vom 18. März 2002…, p. 6326). Members
of different parties reported interpellations concerning the desirability and feasibility of
a framework agreement with the EU (Interpellation Polla Barbara vom 21. Juni 2002…;
Postulat Stähelin Philipp, Rahmenvertrag zwischen…; Interpellation Fehr Hans-Jürg.
Wie weiter mit der EU?...; Interpellation Riklin Kathy. Rahmenabkommen…). They have
not, however, met with a concrete response from the government, but confirmed the need
for a separate report on this matter. Micheline Calmy-Rey, the head of Swiss diplomacy,
among others, was enthusiastic about the signing of such an agreement. According to her,
this document would give bilateral cooperation a concrete regulatory framework. The
general idea is to create a horizontal agreement, to facilitate the efficient management of
existing treaties.
A framework agreement generally relates to the proposal to establish a central coordi-
nating body to organize and harmonize the work of the various joint committees. Such
a committee should be composed of senior representatives of government (ministers and
European Commissioners), supported by experts and representatives of non-govern-
mental organizations (trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry). The proposal
of signing a framework agreement was also assessed by the Conference of Cantonal Gov-
ernments (CCG). According to the cantons, the primary purpose of such a document
should be clear regulation of the transposition of EU law and the institutionalization of
political dialogue. CCG even believe that negotiations on a framework agreement should
take precedence in relation to new bilateral agreements, provided, however, internal re-
forms are carried out first, such as the consolidation of the federal organization of the state
(Bericht des Bundesrates über die Evaluation …, p. 70). Currently, the concept of
a framework agreement can be considered rather unrealistic. It is true that the European
Union has repeatedly expressed interest in signing such a document, but has not taken
a concrete decision (European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010…). The Euro-
pean Commission has also sent clear signals that there is no space to create another prece-
dent for Switzerland. Pre-existing relationships are a special case in the Union’s relations
with third countries. The authorities in Brussels are worried that this may cause a revi-
sionist attitude among the current members of the Community and the countries that as-
pire to joining it. In addition, the conclusion of a framework agreement will de facto
imply the inclusion of Switzerland in the EEA, meaning the adoption of almost all acquis
(except for the service sector) with partial membership in a supranational organization.
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Such an option would be possible only if the lack of consensus with the EU was painful
for the Swiss economy, but for now this is not likely.
Finally, there is also the idea of customs union. However, it seems that neither side is
interested in such a solution,9 especially as the European Union has already had a nega-
tive experience with attempts to introduce customs union with Turkey (Vahl, Grolimund,
2007, p. 127).
Conclusions
There is no doubt that bilateralism, which was initially treated as a period of transi-
tion towards full integration, has become the basis for the relationship. Both sides prob-
ably did not foresee such a scenario. When, in the early 1990s, it was decided to
conclude a number of economic agreements, nobody expected that over the next ten
years the relationship between Switzerland and the European Union will take an un-
precedented dimension. If no significant changes occur in European moods, a model of
cooperation will continue. The problem for the Brussels may be the situation in which
the example of Switzerland would become a model for other present and potential
members of the Union. Bilateralism in relations with Switzerland could evoke revision-
ist concepts within Community and threaten its unity. On the other hand, the case of
Switzerland, if it is found to be effective for both parties, could be successfully applied
also to third countries, such as Russia, Turkey and Israel. According to some opinions,
bilateralism in relations with Switzerland is only the result of its unique location in the
heart of Europe (Cottier, Liechti, 2006, p. 31). This form of cooperation will not be ap-
plied to other partners.
From the Swiss point of view the greatest obstacle to continuing the bilateral relations
are institutional problems. In the report presented on December 20, 2012, the government
called for a new regulatory framework for current and future agreements. It should ensure
the proper implementation of dynamically changing EU laws, dispute resolution and con-
trol the uniformity of the internal market. Switzerland’s proposal to establish an inde-
pendent national supervisory authority is, however, not acceptable to the EU.
If the two parties fail to reach agreement in the near future, the European Union may
propose the solution adopted in the case of the air traffic treaty from 1999. Switzerland
here adopted all EU legislation under the control of the European Commission and ac-
cepted the judgments of the European Court of Justice in this regard. It should be remem-
bered that this is not a precedent, because Switzerland has accepted the judgments of
international institutions in the case of the WTO and the International Criminal Court.
In conclusion, we can point out four main reasons why major changes should not be
expected in the near future. All of them are associated with public votes that have a direct
or indirect impact on relations with the Community.
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9 That proposal was rejected, inter alia, by CCG, see: Europapolitische Standortbestimmung der
Kantonsregierungen vom 25. Juni 2010, p. 1, http://www.kdk.ch/int/kdk/de/mm.ParagraphContainer-
List.ParagraphContainer0.ParagraphList.0026.File.pdf/20100625.pdf, 4.11.2010.
 Extension of the principle of free movement of persons in Croatia. The SVP has alre-
ady announced that they will insist on a referendum, which might be expected no so-
oner than mid-2014.
 Ecopop initiative – referendum on reducing immigration, possible no sooner than
in 2015.
 Co-financing of the EU Cohesion Fund. The referendum, preceded by what will cer-
tainly be a very severe debate, can be expected in 2014. A particularly pro-active
approach should be expected from the SVP.
 Parliamentary elections in 2015. The SVP again will want to gain in the polls on
a wave of criticism of the EU. The election campaign may begin in autumn 2014.
This is why the Swiss government is unlikely to opt for a spectacular change in bilat-
eral relations with the EU before 2016.
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Streszczenie
Perspektywy szwajcarskiej polityki wobec Unii Europejskiej
Stosunki miêdzy Szwajcari¹ a Uni¹ Europejsk¹ mog¹ byæ postrzegane jako interesuj¹ce, a jednoczeœ-
nie jako bezprecedensowy przyk³ad nowej, elastycznej integracji. Mimo ponad dekady owocnej
wspó³pracy, wiele jej aspektów pozostaje kontrowersyjnymi. Problem autonomicznej adaptacji, braku
mo¿liwoœci wp³ywania na procesy decyzyjne na terytorium Wspólnot, otwarcia rynku pracy dla obywa-
teli nowych pañstw cz³onkowskich UE lub inne problemy zwi¹zane z instytucjonalnym wymiarem re-
alizacji umów. To tylko czêœæ problemów, które mog¹ byæ wymienione w tym kontekœcie. Mo¿na wiêc
postawiæ zasadnicze pytanie: co bêdzie dalej? Czy ten bezprecedensowy przyk³ad nowej formy integra-
cji osi¹gn¹³ ju¿ swoje granice? Jakie mog¹ byæ perspektywy przysz³ej wspó³pracy? Celem niniejszego
artyku³u jest próba znalezienia odpowiedzi na powy¿sze pytania. W rozwa¿aniach uwzglêdniono kilka
scenariuszy, bêd¹cych wynikiem analizy aktualnych warunków i doœwiadczeñ, jak równie¿ na oceny
bie¿¹cej strategii politycznej szwajcarskiego rz¹du. Mowa o: kontynuacji stosunków dwustronnych,
przyst¹pieniu do Unii Europejskiej lub zawarciu umowy ramowej czy te¿ stowarzyszenia. Scenariusze
te s¹ analizowane w celu znalezienia odpowiedzi na pytanie o najbardziej prawdopodobny przebieg
przysz³ych stosunków miêdzy Uni¹ Europejsk¹ a Szwajcari¹.
S³owa kluczowe: integracja europejska, Unia Europejska, polityka szwajcarska, umowy bilateralne
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